Christopher Adolph's Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Central Bank Politics: The Myth of PDF
By Christopher Adolph
So much stories of the political financial system of cash specialise in the legislation holding valuable banks from govt interference; this e-book turns to the neglected those that really make financial coverage judgements. utilizing formal thought and statistical proof from dozens of significant banks around the built and constructing worlds, this ebook exhibits that financial coverage brokers will not be the entire related. Molded by means of particular specialist and sectoral backgrounds and pushed via occupation matters, critical bankers with assorted occupation trajectories opt for predictably assorted financial rules. those alterations undermine the common trust that important financial institution independence is a impartial resolution for macroeconomic administration. as a substitute, via cautious choice and retention of imperative bankers, partisan governments can and do impression financial coverage - retaining a political trade-off among inflation and actual monetary functionality even in an age of legally autonomous valuable banks.
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Additional resources for Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Central Bank Politics: The Myth of Neutrality
Agents who have been granted a measure of independence by law are especially likely to attribute their decisions to impartial wisdom and expertise, as these claims are often essential to protecting that independence. Direct tests of career hypotheses are seldom possible, as shown by an infamous episode from the controversial American presidential election of . Al Gore and George W. Bush both needed Florida’s electoral votes to capture the presidency, but the count in Florida was a virtual tie, complicated by a ﬂawed punch-card system that left many votes miscounted or ignored (Imai and King, ).
The principal –agent framework highlights the importance of the interests of principal and agent, on one hand, and of the institutions of agent selection, monitoring, and enforcement on the other. Elegant theoretical and empirical work tackles the question of how political principals monitor, discipline, constrain, oversee, or otherwise control the bureaucracy (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast, ; Epstein and O’Halloran, ; Huber and Shipan, ). But there is something missing from this literature.
And if bureaucrats cannot be neutral, perhaps they are instead selfinterested; focused not on gaining competence, but on extracting rents. But which rents, and how to maximize them? One can discern two diﬀerent, albeit related, visions of homo economicus bureaucratus. The ﬁrst subspecies, associated with public choice, seeks rents, bribes, and perks right now. Following Niskanen (), a common shortcut is to suppose that selﬁsh bureaucratic agents mainly act to maximize their bureaus’ budgets, on the assumption that larger budgets enhance job security, comfort, and the scope for corruption.
Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Central Bank Politics: The Myth of Neutrality by Christopher Adolph